






































Ambler: Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les politiques économiques et l’emploi and 
Université du Québec à Montréal. Adress : CIRPEE, UQAM, C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, 




I would like to thank the FCAR and the SSHRC for generous financial support, and André Kurmann, 
Louis Phaneuf, and seminar participants at the Université du Québec à Montréal for helpful 
discussions. The usual caveats apply. 
 
 Résumé: Les modèles des microfondements des rigidités nominales montrent qu’en 
présence de rigidités réelles, les firmes ont une incitation très forte à ajuster leurs prix 
même si les autres firmes ne le font pas : la rigidité des prix n’est pas un équilibre de 
Nash à moins que le coût fixe d’ajuster les prix soit trop élevé pour être plausible. 
Nous montrons que la rigidité des salaires nominaux peut être un équilibre de Nash 
même sans rigidités réelles et lorsque le coût fixe d’ajuster le salaire nominal est 
relativement faible. La taille du coût d’ajustement nécessaire pour supporter la rigidité 
des salaires nominaux décroît au fur et à mesure que l’élasticité de l’offre de travail 
augmente, mais elle reste très faible pour des valeurs empiriquement plausibles de 
cette élasticité. La taille nécessaire du coût d’ajustement n’est pas sensible au degré 




Abstract : Models of the microfoundations of nominal price rigidities show that in the 
absence of real rigidities, individual firms have strong incentives to adjust prices even 
if other firms do not: price rigidity is not a Nash equilibrium unless the fixed cost of 
adjusting prices is implausibly high. This paper shows that nominal wage rigidity can 
be supported as a Nash equilibrium with relatively small adjustment costs and without 
real rigidities. The size of the necessary adjustment costs decreases labor supply 
elasticity increases, but is quite small for empirically plausible values of the latter. The 
minimum adjustment cost is relatively insensitive to the degree of substitutability 
between types of labor in production. 
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JEL Classification: E1, E3 1 Introduction
An important goal of macroeconomic theory is to provide secure microfounda-
tions for the behavioral equations used in general equilibrium models. The be-
havior of all agents should be based on optimization subject only to tastes and to
technological constraints. This goal extends to price and wage-setting behavior. If
agents ﬁx prices (or wages) ahead of time and if they do not revise these prices in
response to macroeconomic shocks, this should also be an optimal decision based
on technological constraints that make revising prices costly.
The goal of completely endogenizing price and wage-setting behavior has
been put on hold by the “new neoclassical synthesis” in macroeconomics1 (hence-
forth NNS). The NNS approach involves incorporating exogenous nominal rigidi-
ties into dynamic general equilibrium models. Agents are simply constrained ex-
ogenouslyto set prices or wages in advance and not to revise these prices: only the
levelsat whichprices or wages are optimal. The goalof thisresearch program isto
explain, by introducing a plausible degree of exogenous nominal rigidity, the ob-
served rigidity of prices and the highly persistent ﬂuctuations of macroeconomic
aggregates in response to monetary shocks.
Recently, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) established that nominal price
rigidities are not sufﬁcient by themselves to explain the observed large and persis-
tent response of output to monetary shocks. In their model, ﬁrms that are allowed
to adjust their prices make large adjustments that rapidly neutralize the effects
of monetary shocks. In earlier work, Ball and Romer (1990) showed that nom-
inal price rigidities cannot be explained as an equilibrium outcome without the
presence of large real rigidities, which they deﬁne as ﬁrms’ marginal costs being
insensitive to aggregate output: in standard neoclassical models with constant re-
turns to scale and intertemporal substitution in labor supply, ﬁrms’ marginal costs
are highly procyclical, so that they have a strong incentive to adjust their prices
in response to a change in aggregate demand, even if other ﬁrms keep their prices
constant. The loss in proﬁts from not adjusting prices outweighs the ﬁxed costs
of adjusting prices (such as menu costs) unless the latter are implausibly high,
and nominal price rigidity is not a Nash equilibrium.2 In a related paper, Jeanne
(1998) showed that nominal price rigidities combined with real rigidities could
generate substantial persistence in dynamic general equilibrium models. The re-
1The phrase was coined by Goodfriend and King (1997).
2Possible sources of real rigidities include increasing returns to scale, intermediate inputs that
represent a signiﬁcant fraction of production costs, and countercyclical markups due to the elas-
ticity of output demand being procyclical.
3sults of these three papers suggest that the same model features (real rigidities)
lead both to supporting nominal price rigidities as an equilibrium outcome and to
generating a high degree of persistence.3
Huangand Liu(2002)showedrecentlythat astandard neoclassicalmodelwith
monopolisticallycompetitivehouseholdsthatrent differentiatedlabor to ﬁrms and
that set their nominal wages in advance in staggered fashion can generate much
more persistence than an equivalent model with nominal price rigidities. It is not
necessary to introduce substantial real rigidities to generate persistence in models
based on nominal wage rigidities: this is important, given that the empirical plau-
sibility of real rigidities is controversial. Given the relationship in models with
price rigidities between persistence and supporting nominal price rigidity as an
equilibrium outcome, Huang and Liu’s results beg the following question. Can
nominal wage rigidities more easily be supported as an equilibrium outcome than
nominal price rigidities?
This paper answers the question in the afﬁrmative by developing a simple
model of wage determination by monopolistically competitive households. It
shows that nominal wage rigidities can be supported as a Nash equilibrium with
relatively small ﬁxed costs of adjusting wages, and without imposing real rigidi-
ties that reduce the incentives of ﬁrms to adjust prices in response to ﬂuctuations
in aggregate output. It also shows that the size of adjustment costs necessary to
support nominal wage rigidities decreases as the substitutabilitybetween different
types of labor increases, but remains small for empirically plausible values of the
latter. The model also has the property that the minimum adjustmentcost required
to support nominal wage rigidity as a Nash equilibrium is relatively insensitive to
the degree of substitutability between types of labor in production.
The paper is structured as follows. The following (second) section surveys
some recent papers that address the related questions of endogenous persistence,
of supporting nominal rigidities as an equilibrium outcome, and of indeterminacy
and sunspot equilibria. The third section sets up a simple model of wage deter-
mination by monopolistically competitive households that is closely related to the
model of Ball and Romer (1990) and the textbook model of Romer (2000). The
fourth section addresses the model’s calibration, calculates the size of transaction
costs necessary to sustain nominal wage rigidity as a Nash equilibrium, and inves-
tigates the robustness of the results to changes in the model’s parameter values.
3Kiley (1997) relates models with real rigidities to yet another phenomenon. He shows that
the same model features that contribute to endogenous price rigidity and persistence also lead to
indeterminacy and the presence of sunspot equilibria under ﬂexible prices.
4Table 1: Principal Results from the Literature
Type of model Nash Persistence Multiple
Nominal Price rigidity (standard model) no no no
(BR) (CKM) (Kiley)
Nominal Price rigidity (w/ real rigidities) yes yes yes
(BR) (Jeanne, (Kiley)
Alexopoulos)
Nominal Wage rigidity (standard model) yes yes no
(this paper) (HL, AGP, (Kiley)
Andersen, Erceg)
AGP: Ambler, Guay and Phaneuf (2001)
Alexopoulos: Alexopoulos (2001)
Andersen: Andersen (1998)
BR: Ball and Romer (1990)
CKM: Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)
Erceg: Erceg (1997)
HL: Huang and Liu (2002)
Jeanne: Jeanne (1998)
Kiley (1997)
The ﬁfth section addresses the question of the optimal length of wage contracts as
a function of the size of the ﬁxed cost of adjusting the nominal wage. The sixth
section concludes.
2 Literature
Table 1 summarizes the main conclusions of recent research on nominal rigidities
as it relates to persistence, multiple equilibria, and the sustainability of nominal
rigidities as an equilibrium outcome. The table indicates whether the type of
model indicated at the left of a given row is compatible with the phenomenon
indicated in a given column. “Nash” refers to whether or not nominal wage or
price rigidities can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. “Persistence” refers to
whether a temporary shock has a large and prolonged impact on real variables in
5the type of model indicated. “Multiple” refers to whether the particular type of
model can lead to multiple or sunspot equilibria in versions where both wages and
prices are ﬂexible. For each type of model and result, the principal sources of the
result in the literature are indicated.
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) were pioneers in attempting to provide micro-
foundations for nominal price rigidities. Rather than introducing menu costs into
a model with rational price-setting ﬁrms, they investigated how near-rational be-
havior by ﬁrms could affect macroeconomic equilibrium. They set up a model
in which ﬁrms, by not adjusting prices to their new optimal levels in the face of
an aggregate demand shock, suffer only a second-order loss in proﬁts, while the
loss in terms of welfare for the economy as a whole is ﬁrst-order. Mankiw (1985)
reinterpreted Akerlof and Yellen’s near-rationality result as rational behavior in
the face of small ﬁxed costs (menu costs) of changing prices.
These results seemed to provide a theoretical underpinning for nominal rigidi-
ties, but Ball and Romer (1990) showed that this is not the case if the nominal
wage adjusts in response to aggregate demand shocks. They developed a model
with a competitive labor market and plausible labor supply behavior. In order for
nominal price rigidity to be a Nash equilibrium, ﬁrms must be willing to vary
the quantities that they supply without changing their prices. This is not the case
for plausible values of workers’ labor supply elasticity. As aggregate output and
employment adjust in response to a demand shock, the nominal wage responds to
maintain equilibrium in the labor market. A change in the market-clearing nomi-
nal wage shifts the marginal costs curves of ﬁrms and makes their marginal costs
highly procyclical.
Notwithstanding the results of Ball and Romer, researchers in the 1990s con-
tinued to develop dynamic general equilibrium models that imposed exogenous
nominal price rigidities in order to try to explain the persistent effects of demand
shocks on macroeconomic aggregates, leaving aside the question of whether the
nominal price rigidity can be explained as an equilibrium outcome.4 Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2000) showed that dynamic general equilibrium models cannot
explain a large amount of endogenous persistence. They set up a model with a
“small” amount of exogenous price stickiness, that is to say with ﬁrms that ﬁx
their prices for empirically plausible lengths of time. They showed that in order to
generate persistentoutputﬂuctuationsfrom monetary shocks, there must be a high
degree of endogenous price stickiness. This means that ﬁrms, when allowed to ad-
4An exception is Danziger (1999), who built a general equilibrium model in which state-
contingent price adjustment is an equilibrium outcome.
6just their prices, do not change their prices by very much. For plausible parameter
values in their model, this is not the case. Price stickiness is not a signiﬁcant
propagation mechanism for temporary demand shocks.
The paper by Kiley (1997) completes the ﬁrst row of Table 1. He showed
that incorporating real rigidities in dynamic general equilibrium models leads to
two parallel results. First, conﬁrming the results of Ball and Romer (1990), this
can lead to nominal price rigidities being a Nash equilibrium for price-setting
ﬁrms subject to menu costs. Second, when exogenous price stickiness is not im-
posed, the same models with real rigidities lead to multiple dynamic equilibria
and the possibility of sunspot ﬂuctuations. Models with sunspot equilibria can
also produce sizeable and persistent economic ﬂuctuations in the response to de-
mand shocks and even in response to extrinsic uncertainty or sunspots.5 Without
real rigidities, however, standard models with plausible parameter values have
unique steady states and unique saddle-point dynamics in the neighborhood of
their steady states.
In addition to analyzing a standard model with a competitive labor market,
Ball and Romer (1990) also constructed a model with a smaller elasticity of the
equilibrium real wage with respect to variations in aggregate output. This “real
wage function” means that the response of aggregate employment no longer de-
pends on workers’ labor supply elasticities. They showed that if the real wage
is sufﬁciently inelastic to changes in aggregate output, nominal price rigidity can
be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. This gives us the ﬁrst entry in the second
row of the table. Jeanne (1998) took this analysis a step further by showing that
models with nominal price rigidities combined with real rigidities can explain a
substantial amount of persistence. In a related paper, Alexopoulos (2001) built a
dynamic general equilibrium model of the business cycle with efﬁciency wages in
the labor market and limited participation in ﬁnancial markets. Efﬁciency wages
in her model dampen the response of real wages to output ﬂuctuations. She ob-
tained large and persistent responses of real aggregates to demand shocks. The
last column in the second row of Table 1 brings us back to the results of Kiley
(1997), summarized in the preceding paragraph.
To summarize, models with substantial real rigidities can explain endogenous
nominal price rigidity, persistent responses of output and other real variables to
monetary shocks, and multiple or sunspot equilibria. The issue of the empirical
plausibility of the degree of real rigidity that is necessary to lead to substantial
persistence and to endogenous nominal price rigidity is still open.
5See Farmer (1999, chapters 7, 8) for a survey of the literature on indeterminacy and sunspots.
7Huang and Liu (2002) extended a standard dynamic general equilibrium busi-
ness cycle modelto include bothmonopolisticallycompetitiveﬁrms sellingdiffer-
entiated goods and monopolisticallycompetitive households selling differentiated
labor services in the labor market. They contrasted versions of their model with
nominal wage rigidities and nominal price rigidities and showed that, with plausi-
ble parameter values, the staggered price mechanism cannot generate persistence
while the staggered wage mechanism can, given a small degree of (exogenously
imposed) nominal wage rigidity.6 The papers by Erceg (1997) and Andersen
(1998) are complementary to Huang and Liu (2002), and show that nominal wage
rigidities can lead to substantial persistence. Ambler, Guay and Phaneuf (2001)
built a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal wage rigidities and la-
bor adjustment costs, and estimated its parameters using the generalized method
of moments. The model’s overidentifying restrictions were accepted by the data,
and it generated persistent ﬂuctuations in output and employment in response to
temporary aggregate demand shocks. In the case of models with nominal wage
rigidity,theanalogybetweenendogenousstickinessandmultipleequilibriabreaks
down. A corollary of Kiley’s (1997) results is that the standard model cannot
generate indeterminacy and multiple equilibria if exogenous wage stickiness is
removed.
This paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the possibility of supporting nominal wage
rigidity as an equilibrium outcome. The relationship between endogenous persis-
tence and endogenous price stickiness suggests that there may be a similar rela-
tionship in the case of nominal wage rigidities. A closely related paper on the
welfare effects of nominal wage contracts also suggests that this is a promising
avenue to explore. Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997) built a dynamic general equi-
librium business cycle model in which staggered wage contracts ` a la Calvo (1983)
were exogenously imposed. In other words, not only the frequency of adjustment
of wages but also the level to which they adjust was exogenous, instead of the
level being determined optimally by monopolistically competitive wage setters.
In their model, the the welfare loss due to the presence of nominal wage contracts
was quite small (about 0.05% of GDP) for one-year contracts and for degrees of
wage indexation up to 60%.
6Edge (2000) argues that Huang and Liu’s conclusions depend on the assumption that all ﬁrms
use identicalinputs. She sets up a modelin which thereare ﬁrm-speciﬁcfactorinputsand in which
nominal price rigidities can generate as much endogenous persistence as nominal wage rigidities.
83 Basic Model
The model is closely related to Ball and Romer (1990) and Romer (2000, chap-
ter 6). It is a “standard” model in the sense that there are no increasing returns
to scale, no intermediate inputs in production, and monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms face constant-elasticitydemand curves for their output, so that their markups
are constant in response to changes in aggregate demand. The only new feature
is the inclusion, following Huang and Liu (2002), of monopolistic competition in
the labor market, with households that sell differentiated types of labor to ﬁrms.
3.1 Production
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms on the unit interval.
Goods prices are ﬂexible.7 Firms have identical production functions, which de-
pend on an aggregate labor input. Firm
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. Aggregate labor is a composite of different labor types. A given type of
labor is supplied by household




























































￿ is the quantity of labor of type
￿
supplied by household
￿ . In order to distinguish between labor supplied by a par-
ticular type of household and labor demanded by individual ﬁrms, we follow the
convention that the employment of composite labor at individual ﬁrms is indexed
by an
￿
subscript and individual households’ labor supplies are indexed by the ar-
gument
￿ . Aggregate employment is just the sum of employment at the different





















7Because ﬁrms have ﬂat marginal cost curves in the model and because each ﬁrm’s markup
over marginal cost is constant, goods prices will be ﬁxed insofar as nominal wages remain ﬁxed.














































































Households supply labor to ﬁrms. Each household
￿ is a monopoly supplier of a
particular type of labor, and households take into account the conditional demand
for their type of labor when setting their nominal wage. A household of type
￿

































































￿ denotes hours worked. Period utility of
household






































































The aggregate consumption good is a bundle of the goods produced the different






























































































8Two interpretations of the aggregation of different types of labor services are possible. First,
it would be possible to introducea competitive “bundler” (see Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001)
or “broker” who rents labor services from individual households and then rents aggregate labor
services to ﬁrms. The second interpretation is that individual ﬁrms themselves hire different types
of labor from individual households. Nothing substantive hinges on the interpretation.

























With constant-elasticity demand curves, ﬁrms set markups which are a ﬁxed pro-
portion of their marginal cost of production. Households derive income from
wages, from dividend payments by ﬁrms, and from government transfers. The





































































￿ denotes the household’sholdings of nominal moneybalances,
^
￿ de-






￿ denotes the real value of transfers from the government. The household’s






































This condition is standard. It says that the marginal disutility of working an extra
hour must be equal to the marginal utility of consumption from working an extra
hour, taking into account the fact that because the household is a monopolistic
supplier of labor services, working more has a negative effect on the household’s
real wage.
3.3 Symmetrical Flexible-Wage Equilibrium












￿ is the aggregate money stock. All householdsin the model are identical,
so all will choose the same nominal wage and consumption level. Imposing a
symmetrical equilibrium and aggregating, the model can be reduced to the cash-





























































Equation (13) follows from proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms. The price of output is
proportional to the marginal cost of production, which is equal to the nominal
wage. Equation (14) is the aggregate production function. Equation (15) reﬂects
the fact that there is no public spending and no investment in the model: all of
aggregate output is consumed. Equation (16) follows directly from aggregating
households’ ﬁrst order conditions for the choice of the nominal wage. Equations


















￿ using (15) and (14), the
































It can easily be shown that the optimal level of output for a social planner who
maximizes the utility of a representative household (imposingthe same number of
hours worked and consumption across all households) is equal to one. The equi-
librium value of output is lower than this ﬁrst-best optimum because of house-




f tend to inﬁnity, this monopoly power disappears and
the market equilibrium converges to the social optimum.
4 Fixed Nominal Wages as a Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the impact on one household of a reduction in aggre-
gate demand (a fall in the nominal money supply) if all other households maintain
a constant nominal wage. The household will have an incentive to adjust its wage.
It remains to be seen whether the welfare loss from not adjusting is small enough
so that a small ﬁxed cost of adjustment would support nominal wage rigidities as
an equilibrium outcome.
We follow the same line of reasoning that Ball and Romer (1990) and Romer
(2000) applyto price adjustmentby ﬁrms. We assumethat the economyis initially
in an equilibrium compatible with full wage and price ﬂexibility. Then, we posit
12a reduction in the money stock and suppose that all households but one maintain
a constant nominal wage. For the remaining household, we calculate the level
of utility it can attain if it maintains a constant nominal wage and if it adjusts its
wage optimally in reaction to the shock. Finally, we express the utility loss from
not adjusting its wage as a compensating variation, which is just the percentage
of its level of consumption with a constant nominal wage that it would have to
receive to be made as well off as if it adjusted its wage optimally.






￿ the utility level of a household that does
not adjust its nominal wage when aggregate demand decreases, assuming that




























where the numbered subscripts are used to refer to consumption and labor supply







the utility level of a household that adjusts




























































































































































































































This is just the amount of additional consumption that the household (that does
not adjust its wage) must be given to make it as well off as if it did adjust its wage,
expressed as a fraction of the level of consumption that it enjoys if it keeps a ﬁxed
nominal wage.
























an elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage equal to one half. The
R parameter affects the level of the real wage, but not the level of employment








because of equations (17) and (14). The value of
d
is taken from Ball
and Romer (1990) and Romer (2000, chapter 6), and gives a markup of 25% over
marginal cost. The value of
f is close to the upper end of the range of values
estimated by Grifﬁn (1992, 1996). With these parameter values, the ﬂexible-wage
equilibrium gives a level of output, employment, and consumption equal to 0.894,
less than the ﬁrst-best level of output with ﬂexible wages, which is equal to 1.0.
We consider, following Romer (2000, chapter 6) a three percent drop in the
moneysupply. If all householdsbut one maintain a constant nominalwage, output
and employment fall to 97% of their ﬂexible wage/price levels. With parameters
equal to their base-case values, the compensating variation amounts to 0.13% of
the initial level of consumption.9 In other words, an individual household suffers
a utility loss equivalent to a little over one tenth of one percent of its initial con-
sumption level if it foregoes adjusting its nominal wage. This can be compared to
the result in Romer (2000) using a similar model that a ﬁrm’s loss from not adjust-
ing its output price in response to a three percent drop in aggregate demand would
9In the model of Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997), the welfare cost of labor contracts is equal
to 0.05% of GDP with one-year contracts. Three main differences explain the differences in our
results. First, their model contains capital. Second, they calculate the welfare loss for calibrated
values of the variances of technology and monetary shocks, while here we consider the costs of
a once-and-for-all drop in aggregate demand of 3%. Third, in their model, the amount by which
householdsadjust their wage is determinedby their ad hoc wage adjustment equation, while in the
model of this paper it is determined by households’ optimal behavior.
14amount to approximately 25% of its revenue. The conclusion of this analysis is
clear: the size of adjustment costs necessary to support nominal wage rigidity as
a Nash equilibrium is an order of magnitude smaller than the adjustment costs
needed to support nominal price rigidity as an equilibrium outcome.
4.1 Discussion
In the basic model developed above, nominal wage rigidity naturally gives rise to
real rigidity in the following sense. Labor is the only factor of production, and
there are constant returns to scale. Since ﬁrms are assumed to be price takers in
the labor market, each individual’s ﬁrm’s marginal cost curve is ﬂat. In response
to variations in aggregate demand, if nominal wages are ﬁxed then nominal prices
(which are equal to marginal costs under perfect competition or to a constant
markup over marginal costs under monopolistic competition in the goods market
with constant-elasticity demand curves) remain constant as well. The real wage is
completely rigid in response to changes in output. Contrast this to a model similar
to the basic model but with only nominal price rigidities and with monopolistic
competition only in the goods market. In order for aggregate output to change,
employment must change, and furthermore employment must lie on the aggregate
labor supply curve. If labor supply is relatively inelastic, the nominal wage is
highly sensitive to variations in output and employment.
In Figure 1, we reinterpret the discussion in Romer (2000, chapter 6). The
graph illustrates the incentives of an individual ﬁrm to reduce its output price in
the face of a negativemonetary shock which reduces aggregate demand, under the
assumption that all other ﬁrms in the economy do not adjust their output prices.
For a given nominal wage rate, the ﬁrm’s marginal cost curve is completely ﬂat in
the model developed above, since labor is the only factor of production and there
are constant returns to scale. If there is no adjustment of the nominal wage, the
ﬁrm’s optimal price does not change, since its optimal markup is a ﬁxed percent-
age of its marginal cost. However, we know that if aggregate employment falls,
this entails a downward movement along the aggregate labor supply curve. From
the individual ﬁrm’s point of view, there is an exogenous decrease in the nominal
wage at which it can hire workers. Its marginal cost curve shifts down, and its
incentive to adjust its price is captured by the shaded triangular area.
The analysis is very different in the case of a household considering whether
or not to adjust its nominal wage. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of












































































































The left hand side gives the household’s marginal revenue from decreasing its
nominal wage by a small amount, measured in units of consumption, while the
right hand side gives the marginal cost in terms of foregone leisure. The marginal









￿ because of the increasing disutility of
work and downward-sloping demand curve for the household’s labor services.
The aggregate price level acts as a shift variable for the households marginal cost
curve, just as the aggregate nominal wage rate acts as a shift variable for each
ﬁrm’s marginal cost curve in Figure 1.
In the basic model, with constant returns to labor in the production function,
there is endogenous price rigidity. As long as other households maintain a con-
stant nominal wage, ﬁrms maintain constant prices. The price level is a shift vari-
able for the marginal cost curve depicted in Figure 2, but there is in fact no shift
in the marginal cost curve. The incentive for an individual household to adjust its
wage in response to a drop in aggregate demand is given by the shaded triangular
area in Figure 2, much smaller than what its incentive would be with a downward
shift in its marginal cost curve.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 shows how the size of the compensating variation changes in response to




, which measures the inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply.














The table shows that the costs of not adjusting the nominal wage increase as
labor supply elasticity decreases. In this respect, the results are similar to those
of Ball and Romer (1990). If we interpret a high labor supply elasticity to mean
high real wage rigidity, then more real wage rigidity means that smaller costs
of adjusting nominal wages can support nominal wage rigidity as an equilibrium
outcome.
However, the results are quantitatively very different than the results for price









corresponds to a labor supply elasticity of 0.1), the
costs of not adjusting the real wage amount to only one third of one percent of the
household’s initial consumption level.
Table 4 shows how the compensating variation changes with the value of
d
,
the elasticity of substitutionbetween different types of labor. The table shows that
the costs to the household of not adjusting its nominal wage are not very sensitive
to the degree of substitutability between labor types in the model.
5 Optimal Contract Length
The results derivedso far have been static, having to do with the cost of not adjust-
ing the nominal wage in the same period as an aggregate demand shock hits. It is
possible to calculate the socially optimal contract length that maximizes expected
utility for a representative household given the stochastic process generating the
money supply and a given ﬁxed cost of adjusting the nominal wage.
In this section, we modify the model so that each household ﬁxes its nominal






￿ with which the nominal wage contract
17“expires”atthebeginningofeach period. Householdssettheirnominalwageopti-
mally knowing that at the beginning of each period they will receive a signal (with
probability
# ) to reoptimize their nominal wage. This formulation was originally
applied to price setting by Calvo (1983). It can be shown that this setup leads to


































































where the “ ˜ ” notation indicates that variables are measured in proportional de-
viations from their steady state levels,
￿
￿
￿ is the nominal wage set by households




￿ is the average nominal wage




￿ is notional labor supply.11 The
L
parameter is related to































































































































10See Huang and Liu (2002) or Ambler, Guay and Phaneuf (2001) for a derivation.
11Notional labor supply is the number of hours that would satisfy households’ ﬁrst order con-
dition for the choice of hours. Ex post, after ﬁxing the nominal wage, households agree to supply

































































, assuming that the
ﬁxed cost of adjustingthe nominal wage is equal to 0.10% of the steady-state level










￿ 12 and for different values of the probability that a household is
allowed to revise its nominal wage. The sample period was set equal to 10,000.
The simulations yielded values for the proportional deviations of variables
from their steady state levels. It was then possible to calculate the unconditional
expected utility for a representative household that works at and owns shares in
all ﬁrms, so that it pays just the per capita amount of adjustment costs, equal to
the fraction of households adjusting their wage times the adjustment cost.13
The results, which are presented in Table 5, are quite intuitive. Unconditional
expected utility follows an inverse “U” shape as a function of the probability that
a given wage contract remains in force at the beginning of each period. Average








￿ . For small values of
# (a very short average
contract length), an increase in
# improves unconditional expected utility because
the savings in aggregate adjustment costs swamp the loss due to the increased
volatility of consumption, which arises from the magniﬁed impact of monetary
shocks on output as contracts increase in length. As the average contract length
increases, the marginal adjustment cost savings from further increases in contract










, thetwoeffects offseteach other, and unconditionalexpected
utility is maximized. If given the opportunity to choose
# once and for all given
the stochastic process generating the money supply and given the size of the ﬁxed
12The
￿ parameter is almost the only parameter of the model whose value depends on the
assumed length in calendar time of one period in the model. We assume that one period is equal
to one quarter. The interpretation of the size of the ﬁxed cost of adjusting the nominal wage as a
fraction of annual output also depends on the length of the period.
13An alternativeassumptionthat yields the same results is that there are completeasset markets,
with transfers among households each period that ensure that each household pays only its per
capita share of total adjustment costs.
19Table 5: Unconditional Expected Utility as a Function of d
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average contract length of ﬁve quarters. The consensus view (see Taylor, 1999)
is that average contract length in the U.S. is equal to about four quarters. So, if a
given household must pay an adjustment cost of 0.10% of its per-period consump-
tion to adjust its nominal wage, the socially optimal contract length would be as
long or longer than the average duration of wage contracts in the U.S. data. With
20% of households adjusting their wage each period, total per capita adjustment
costs would amount in this economy to 0.02% of GDP. Given this ﬁgure, inter-
preting the observed average length of wage contracts as an equilibrium outcome
in the face of ﬁxed costs of renegotiating wage contracts is well within the realm
of plausibility.
In addition, it is possible that the equilibriumcontract lengthin a decentralized
economy is greater than the social optimum due to the presence of externalities,
as argued by Ball (1987). A decision by one household to increase its contract
length implies that the average wage level responds more slowly to aggregate
demand shocks, and hence the price level responds more slowly as well. This
makes it easier for other households to forecast future prices when setting their
nominal wage, which is a positive externality. On the other hand, the real money
supply is more variable, which implies a greater variability of aggregate demand
and therefore the demandfor other ﬁrms’ products. The second effect is a negative
externality. Ball (1987) shows that if the net externality is negative, the contract
20length chosen in a symmetric Nash equilibrium will be greater than the social
optimum.14
6 Conclusions
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) were among the ﬁrst researchers to
investigate the question of whether small macroeconomic frictions could explain
large ﬂuctuations in response to exogenous shocks. These frictions have been
interpreted as “menu costs”, literally the costs of printing menus with revised
prices.15 Ball and Romer (1990) showed that in the absence of important real
rigidities, menu costs would have to be huge in order for ﬁrms to decide not to
change prices in the face of modest ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand, because
of the endogenous adjustment of real wages in response to shifts in aggregate
demand. In the textbook example of Romer (2000), when faced with a 3% drop in
aggregate demand the costs in foregone proﬁts to a ﬁrm of not adjusting its prices
amount to over a quarter of its revenue.
This paper has shown that it is much more plausible to justify nominal wage
rigidities as an equilibrium in the presence of small macroeconomic frictions. For
plausible parameter values in the basic model, the costs of not adjusting wages in
response to a fall in aggregate demand of 3% are 0.13% of initial consumption.
Costs of this size may well be less than the costs of renegotiating and resigning
a new labor contract. In an extension to the model, for plausible parameteriza-
tion of the money supply process, if adjusting the nominal wage costs 0.1% of
the value of per-period consumption under ﬂexible wages, a contract length of
ﬁve quarters maximizes the expected utility of the representative household. This
corresponds to or exceeds the average length of wage contracts in the data, and
entails adjustment costs that in aggregate amount to only 0.02% of GDP.
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